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CORPORATE FREE MARKET 
RESPONSIBILITY: ADDRESSING RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS WITH A FIDUCIARY DUTY 
APPROACH TO NATURAL RESOURCE 
EXTRACTIONS IN WEAK GOVERNANCE 
ZONES 
The deep irony is that it is the unfettered rise of corporate power 
that presents the biggest threat to free markets, and to the ability of 




While the free market has been characterized by some as a conduit for 
individual freedom,2 absent institutional prerequisites such as property 
protections and voluntary contracting, it risks transforming into just the 
opposite.3 Nowhere is this dysfunctional transformation more apparent, yet 
largely unaccounted for, than in the context of corporate natural resource 
extractions in weak governance zones,4 where many of these institutional 
prerequisites are lacking. In pursuing shareholder profit maximization, 
corporate conduct is premised on the same free market principles, the 
absence of which can impede the legitimacy of its contracts.5
                                                                                                                 
 1. Stephanie Blankenburg & Dan Plesch, Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Restoring 
Legal Accountability (2007), available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-
institutions_government/corporate_responsibilities_4605.jsp. 
 2. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 8 (1962). 
 3. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights 
and transitional corporations and other business enterprises, Business and Human Rights: 
Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, 3, 
A/HRC/4/035 (9 Feb. 2007) [hereinafter SRSG Report] (“Markets function efficiently and 
sustainably only when certain institutional parameters are in place. The preconditions for success 
generally are assumed to include the protection of property rights, the enforceability of contracts, 
competition, and the smooth flow of information.”). 
 4. Weak governance zones can be “defined as those states, as well as regions or sub-regions 
within states, in which governments cannot or will not assume their roles in protecting rights—
including human rights—providing basic public services and ensuring that public sector 
management is efficient and effective.” INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF EMPLOYERS, 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES 3 
(2006). 
 5. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 From 
Colombia to Burma, corporate contracts that are voluntary with respect to 
the contracting government are made at the expense of local communities 
whose property interests are either undermined or never accounted for. 
Often, for example, property is physically confiscated, communities are 
displaced without compensation, environmental effects of new industry 
create new hazards for local communities, project revenues are 
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misappropriated, or local stakeholders are excluded from local 
development.6 The end result is often local protest followed by state 
repression accompanied by human rights abuses.7
Legal remedies such as the Alien Tort Claims Act
 
8 (ATCA) have 
generally been applied to address human rights abuses under an emerging 
doctrine of corporate social responsibility.9 The validity of contracts from 
the perspective of the corporation’s free market responsibilities, however, 
has frequently escaped scrutiny. This oversight results from a failure to 
account for the first half of a dual-tier pattern of abuses.10 Extractive 
operations initially result in first-tier property violations, which entail 
displacement of local populations, interference with their use of property,11
                                                                                                                 
 6. Tarek F. Maassarani, Margo Tatgenhorst Drakos & Joanna Pajkowska, Extracting 
Corporate Responsibility: Towards a Human Rights Impact Assessment, 40 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 
135, 138–40 (2007). 
 7. For example, see Andrew Bosson, Forced Migration/Internal Displacement in Burma 53 
(May 2007), available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/ 
(httpDocuments)/D057F0FCA432F4B5C12572D7002B147B/$file/Burma_report_mai07.pdf 
(noting that the energy sector, which is the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in Burma, 
is associated with forced labor, forced relocations, and widespread land confiscations); HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA’S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES (1999) [hereinafter HRW NIGERIA 
REPORT], available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/Nigew991-01.htm#P190_8265; 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, COLOMBIA – A LABORATORY OF WAR: REPRESSION AND VIOLENCE 
IN ARAUCA (2004) [hereinafter AI COLOMBIA REPORT], available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/report/info/AMR23/004/2004; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NIGERIA 
TEN YEARS ON: INJUSTICE AND VIOLENCE HAUNT THE OIL DELTA (2006) [hereinafter AI NIGERIA 
REPORT], available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/report/info/AFR44/022/2005; Robert Dufresne, 
The Opacity of Oil: Oil Corporations, Internal Violence, and International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 331, 336 (2004). 
 
 8. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 9. While a strict definition of corporate social responsibility is elusive, Thomas McInerny 
characterizes it as: 
an umbrella term that refers to a variety of initiatives ranging from voluntary codes of 
conduct to programs whereby companies can undergo external audits to verify the 
adequacy of their practices in a variety of areas of social concern. Although generally 
lacking formal state power of sanction, these efforts look to international law for their 
normative authority, intending to apply sometimes-latent international legal 
prescriptions directly to corporations. 
Thomas McInerny, Putting Regulation Before Responsibility: Towards Binding Norms of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171, 172 (2007). John Ruggie notes that: 
corporate responsibility is being shaped through the interplay of two developments: one 
is the expansion and refinement of individual responsibility by the international ad hoc 
criminal tribunals and the ICC Statute; the other is the extension of responsibility for 
international crimes to corporations under domestic law. The complex interaction 
between the two is creating an expanding web of potential corporate liability for 
international crimes—imposed through national courts. 
SRSG Report, supra note 3, at 8. 
 10. See discussion infra Part II. 
 11. Id. 
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or exclusion from profits earned from their displacement.12 Corporate 
recruitment of abusive state forces to protect their operations from resulting 
unrest consequently generates second-tier human rights violations of 
protesting communities, including widespread detentions, extrajudicial 
killings, and forced disappearances.13
In highlighting free market questions implicated by first-tier property 
violations, it is argued here that in order to preserve the legitimacy of a 
corporate contract for natural resource extractions, a corporation must adapt 
its fiduciary duty to address, rather than exploit, distortions created by the 
accountability gaps present in weak governance zones. Two such 
distortions are (1) the politicization of corporate activity and (2) the creation 
of a new breed of investor: affected landowners as involuntary investors.
 
14 
In this context, it is not enough that directors be given greater discretion to 
exercise business judgment15 in accounting for broader stakeholder 
interests.16 An expanded fiduciary duty should encompass a broader duty of 
due diligence to local communities. The fact that property interests of local 
community members are frequently invested in the corporate endeavor 
against their will is more, not less, reason to ensure that their interests are 
accounted for by a governance structure that prioritizes voluntary 
contracting.17 In furtherance of this duty, corporations should be required to 
put in place a preventative compliance system, which includes impact 
assessments, community consultations, and reporting requirements.18
Much of the existing scholarship proposes similar compliance schemes, 
but looks at corporate accountability from the perspective of its consistency 
with human rights principles.
 
Absent representative local governance in countries where the extractions 
are taking place, each of these measures serves to address the accountability 
gap, ensure property protections, and preserve corporate free market 
legitimacy. 
19
                                                                                                                 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 15. The “business judgment rule” is a presumption that the directors are acting in the 
corporation’s best interest. Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 609 (Del. Ch. 1974). 
This results in “a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation 
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the 
best interests of the company.”  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Zapata 
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 
(Del. 1985). 
 16. See discussion infra Part V. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT C. THOMPSON, COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: 
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 5 (2006); John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International 
Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819 (2007); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an 
Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CINN. L. REV. 75 (2005). 
 This note aims to highlight ways in which 
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contemporary corporate governance in the United States has failed to 
appropriately account for its role in weak governance zones in a manner 
consistent with its own free market principles. In examining local responses 
to natural resource extraction in countries such as Colombia, Burma, and 
Nigeria, Part II of this note identifies the dual-tier rights violations that 
occur when corporate contracts with unrepresentative governments displace 
local communities and subject protesting populations to abuse. Part III 
highlights the limitations of existing legal remedies, which have been 
tailored to address second-tier human rights violations with little 
opportunity for addressing the root causes of these violations. Part IV 
explores the free market underpinnings of the shareholder primacy model 
and its role in generating distortions in weak governance zones. 
Recognizing these distortions, Part V argues for an expanded conception of 
corporate fiduciary duties to address first-tier violations. Finally, Part VI 
concludes the note by briefly evaluating the challenges and prospects for 
such an approach. 
II. UNACCOUNTABLE EXTRACTIONS AND THE DUAL-TIER 
STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS 
Corporate contracts for natural resource extractions in weak governance 
zones, which will be referred to here as unaccountable extractions,20 
frequently result in a hierarchy of abuses. An unaccountable extraction that 
results in dual-tier public and private rights violations generally is 
embodied by three elements: (1) an agreement between a corporation and 
an unrepresentative regime21 that (2) licenses the corporation to extract 
natural resources22 (3) either from property on which local communities 
live23 or in a way that substantially affects the surrounding population’s use 
of the land.24 Such extractions typically result in second-tier human rights 
violations,25 which commonly occur when state military forces are recruited 
to protect oil operations or installations in response to local protest.26 
Recent attention to human rights violations, although long-awaited, has in 
some ways served to overshadow corporate involvement in first-tier 
property rights violations, which occur when local property interests are 
negatively affected in the course of the extraction.27
                                                                                                                 
 20. The term “unaccountable extractions” refers to extractions carried out pursuant to an 
agreement with a corporation and a governing regime in a weak governance zone that generally 
does not take into account local interests and needs in decision-making. 
 21. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 Oil operations initiated 
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by Occidental Petroleum in Colombia, Unocal in Burma, and Shell in 
Nigeria serve as three illustrations of this inverse dynamic, in which the 
international community, strapped for adequate market remedies, has been 
forced to target the result rather than the cause. Working backwards from 
second-tier violations, which have been the focus of recent scrutiny,28
A. SECOND-TIER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
 helps 
reveal the severe effects and importance of accounting for first-tier property 
rights violations. 
The dynamics of second-tier human rights violations are exemplified by 
corporate involvement in the oil-rich north-eastern region of Arauca in 
Colombia.29 The region has experienced protracted instability, 
militarization, and abuse of civilian populations, due in part to competing 
oil interests between government forces, paramilitary auxiliaries, and 
guerilla insurgents.30 The U.S. company Occidental Petroleum (Occidental) 
intervened in this complex set of relationships in affiliation with the 
Colombian government. Occidental began pumping oil in Colombia in 
1985 based on an “association contract” with Ecopetrol, a state oil company 
that owned fifty percent of the pipeline.31
                                                                                                                 
 28. In Doe v. Unocal Corp., for example, a district court examined allegations of murder, 
assault, rape, torture, forced labor, and destruction of homes and property brought by local farmers 
who challenged Unocal’s extractive operations in the Burma. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 
880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 29. Colombia constitutes a weak governance zone by virtue of its ongoing internal conflict. As 
Amnesty International noted in 2004, “Colombia has spent most of the last 50 years under various 
states of emergency through which constitutional guarantees have been side-stepped, governments 
have ruled by executive decree, and the military have been granted broad powers to deal with 
public order issues. This has led to widespread, flagrant human rights violations.”  AI COLOMBIA 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 3. 
 30. The emergence of guerilla groups during La Violencia in the 1950’s resulted in the 
consolidation of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionares de Colombia (FARC) in 1966, which is 
now the largest guerilla group in Colombia established to protect the pro-liberal sectors within the 
country. AI COLOMBIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 4–5. The second largest guerilla group is the 
Ejército de Liberación Nacional. Id. These groups have secured control over various local 
governments, establishing strongholds, extorting rural estates, and launching increasing attacks on 
civilian populations. Id. During its counter-insurgency operations, the Colombian army has 
depended on private armed paramilitary groups, which have been implicated in the majority of 
civilian killings and disappearances. Id. To circumvent liability, the armed forces have used these 
paramilitary auxiliaries to outsource the pursuit of their aims through illegal conduct. Id. As a 
result all three groups—the guerillas, the government armed forces, and the paramilitary groups—
have abused civilians, often in pursuit of profits linked to the oil-rich north-eastern department of 
Arauca. Id. Because of its strategic importance, Arauca has become a highly militarized zone. Id. 
The government has experimented with various security policies in the region, paramilitaries have 
likewise clamped down to secure domestic and international interests in conjunction with 
government armed forces, and FARC has responded by heightening intimidation of the civilian 
population. 
 31. Occidental owns the second half along with Repson-YPF, a Spanish company. Id. at 6–7. 
 After more than 900 attacks on 
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the pipeline following its drilling operations,32 Occidental began funding 
the Eighteenth Brigade, the local army unit, providing helicopters, fuel, 
uniforms, vehicles, and approximately $750,000 a year for “logistical 
support.”33 The Eighteenth Brigade has since been accused of various 
abuses including cooperation with paramilitary groups in the abduction and 
killing of alleged guerilla supporters.34
The oil-rich Niger Delta region of southern Nigeria has similarly been 
plagued by escalating conflict surrounding oil production.
 
35 In the 1990’s, 
the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) mobilized 
the Ogonis to challenge federal distribution of oil revenues and the 
activities of Shell in the region. Following protests at its facilities, Shell 
closed production.36 Members of the Ogoni tribe were detained, beaten, and 
summarily executed by the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force, 
which, like the Eighteenth Brigade, was created to suppress protests.37
In Burma,
 
38 Unocal Corporation entered into an agreement with the 
government to initiate the Yadana gas pipeline project, which was worth an 
estimated $1.2 billion.39 Unocal and one of its subsidiaries are believed to 
have hired the State Law and Restoration Council (SLORC)40 to help build 
its offshore drilling stations for the purpose of extracting natural gas from 
the Andaman Sea to transport gas from Burma to Thailand.41
                                                                                                                 
 32. T. Christian Miller, A Colombian Village Caught in a Cross-Fire, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 
2002, at A-1, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0317-01.htm. 
 33. Id. U.S. funds have gone towards the creation of the Fifth Mobile Brigade, which was 
created specifically to protect the pipeline. AI COLOMBIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 7. 
 34. While Occidental denied paying for arms, it is unclear how the corporation controlled or 
channeled the use of its funds by the Eighteenth Brigade. Miller, supra note 32. British Petroleum 
similarly contracted with the Colombian army for a three-year period, paying a sum of $60 
million. Dufresne, supra note 7, at 344–45. In 1998, a U.S.-funded Colombian air force helicopter 
bombed the village of Santo Domingo, killing seventeen civilians with U.S. munitions. AI 
COLOMBIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
 35. AI NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. 
 36. HRW NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 9. 
 37. Ken Saro-Wiwa, the leader of the MOSOP, and eight additional Ogonis were arrested for 
murder of tribal leaders and executed following a military trial. Id. 
 38. Following a military coup in 1962, Burma remained under military rule characterized by 
widespread political oppression and economic mismanagement, with Burma’s key industries 
controlled by military-run enterprises. BBC News Country Profile: Burma, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1300003.stm. 
 Affected 
farmers in the Tenasserim region of Burma subsequently brought suit 
 39. Unocal Pays Out on Burma Abuses, BBC NEWS, Mar. 22, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4371995.stm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
 40. In 1990, following multi-party elections, the military junta, the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC) refused to recognize the National League for Democracy’s 
electoral victory, preventing the party from taking political office. BBC News Country Profile: 
Burma, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1300003.stm; SLORC Coup in 
Burma, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/slorc.htm. 
 41. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
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alleging murder, assault, rape, torture, forced labor, and destruction of 
homes and property.42




B. FIRST-TIER PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
 has often overshadowed the root causes of such 
violations and corporate involvement in creating the environment for such 
abuses by initiating first-tier property rights violations. 
In Colombia, Nigeria, and Burma, second-tier human rights violations 
such as detentions, killings, beatings, and summary executions have often 
been a product of first-tier property violations. Local property rights are 
adversely affected by unaccountable extractions in several ways. Violations 
include interference with ancestral land,44 taking of property without 
compensation,45 lack of adequate profit-sharing,46 failure to follow through 
in development agreements,47 and failure to account evenly for competing 
tribal property interests during the negotiation process.48
The use of ancestral lands for natural resource explorations has posed 
particular problems for indigenous groups.
 
49 As the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights has noted: “[T]he problems encountered by 
an Indian population as a result of relocation can affect that population 
seriously, considering the special ties they have with their original lands. In 
the Indian’s complex scheme of values, what gives meaning to life is its 
intrinsic connection with their land . . . .”50
For indigenous groups, communal land rights are frequently crucial to 
cultural preservation.
 
51 Thus, self-determination struggles have been 
perceived as encompassing “the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources.”52
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id. at 883. 
 43. See discussion infra Part III. 
 44. See Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Hybrid State-Corporate Enterprise and Violations of 
Indigenous Land Rights: Theorizing Corporate Responsibility and Accountability Under 
International Law, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 135, 136 (2007) (highlighting indigenous rights to 
ancestral lands). 
 45. See Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 885. 
 46. See AI NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. 
 47. Id. at 3. 
 48. Id. at 4; see also Maassarani, supra note 6, at 138–40. 
 49. Miranda, supra note 44, at 136. 
 50. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights 
of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin, 27 (Nov. 29, 1983). 
 51. Id. 
 52. This principle is characterized as follows: “Peoples and nations must have the authority to 
manage and control their natural resources and in doing so to enjoy the benefits of their 
development and conservation.”  U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion & Protection of Human Rights, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, Erica Irene A. 
Daes, Indigenous Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 5, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30 (July 13, 2004) [hereinafter ECOSOC Report on Indigenous Peoples]. 
 The principle serves as a means for newly independent 
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states to preserve economic sovereignty against inequitable contracts 
between external states and companies.53 For example, in 1995, Colombia 
granted an oil exploration license to Occidental of Colombia, a subsidiary 
of Occidental.54 The government’s license authorized Occidental to drill on 
the ancestral lands of the indigenous U’wa people.55 While the exploration 
proved futile, the license disregarded the specialized rights of the U’wa 
people to their ancestral lands and exposed them to future susceptibility to 
similar explorations.56
Even where ancestral land rights are not at issue, corporations such as 
Unocal are frequently accused of failing to compensate communities for 
land taken.
 
57 As a result of the agreement between Unocal and the SLORC, 
individuals in the Tenasserim region were either forced to relocate from 
their place of residence, forced to contribute labor and property, or 
subjected to various forms of violence.58 Local populations, such as the 
Tenasserim farmers, often lose twofold: first, when their property is taken 
by foreign industries, and second, when profits earned from the extractive 
operations are not reinvested in the affected community.59 In Nigeria, for 
example, while ninety-eight percent of the country’s foreign exchange 
earnings are derived from oil revenues, constituting nearly eighty percent of 
the country’s budget, the people of the Niger Delta see little of this 
revenue.60 Despite high profit earnings, local communities often continue to 
live at the poverty level without adequate infrastructure: electricity supplies 
are erratic, water quality is poor, and the ongoing burning of gas continues 
to contaminate the local environment.61
Corporations that do agree to provide some form of compensation often 
refuse to follow through on development agreements,
 
62
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. This right is derived from common article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: “All 
peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. . . . In no 
case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.”  Id; see also International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1(2), Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95–2 (1978), 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
 54. Miranda, supra note 44, at 136. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 137. 
 57. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 58. It was believed that joint venturists, “through the SLORC military, intelligence and/or 
police forces, have used and continue to use violence and intimidation to relocate whole villages, 
enslave farmers living in the area of the proposed pipeline, and steal farmers’ property for the 
benefit of the pipeline.”  Id. In Doe v. Unocal Corp., plaintiffs challenged the corporation’s 
contract with the SLORC, arguing that, as a function of this contract, “SLORC soldiers forced 
farmers to relocate their villages, confiscated property and forced inhabitants to clear forest, level 
the pipeline route, build headquarters for pipeline employees, prepare military outposts and carry 
supplies and equipment.”  Id. at 885. 
 59. See AI NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 2–3. 
 62. Id. 
 or fail to take into 
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account the complex tribal distribution of property interests and 
consequently exclude interested communities from negotiations for oil 
exploration.63 Protesters in the Niger Delta, for example, have challenged 
Chevron Nigeria’s failure to provide jobs and development projects in 
exchange for a “non-disruptive operating environment” agreed to under a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the protestors and the company.64 
Communities that protest or obstruct oil production have been targeted by 
security forces, which have razed communities and killed civilians.65 In the 
village of Odioma in Nigeria, seventeen individuals were reportedly killed 
by government forces in retaliation for the killing of local councilors.66 
Eighty percent of homes were subsequently razed.67 The violence can be 
linked to a dispute between neighboring communities over control of land 
sought for oil exploration.68 Shell Nigeria’s compensation of one 
constituency at the expense of others exacerbated local tensions.69
Looking at the various ways in which unaccountable extractions 
adversely affect local property interests, it is clear that a key underlying 
element of the ensuing human rights violations is the initial first-tier 
property violations.
 
70 Corporations that have used shareholder assets to 
initiate such extractions implicate not only the ownership rights of the 
shareholders but also the ownership rights of the local communities.71 An 
emerging contemporary corporate social responsibility regime is now 
encouraging accountability in these various contexts.72
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. at 4–5 
 64. Id. at 4. 
 65. AI NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 19. 
 66. Id. at 4. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. Violence erupted in the village of Odioma in Nigeria when a Joint Task Force raided 
the community in search of a vigilante group suspected of killing local counselors. Amnesty 
International noted that the violence was a result of conflict between communities within the same 
ethnic group over control of the land designated for oil exploration. After identifying two specific 
communities as the landowners, Shell Nigeria had to withdraw from the area when it learned that 
ownership of the land was in dispute. Id. at 4–5. 
 69. Id. 
 70. In 2005, the Joint Task Force, which was also a government security force created to 
protect major oil installations, fired on protesters at an oil terminal operated by Chevron Nigeria. 
Id. at 3. As Robert Dufresne explains,  “In response to the expression of despair and social 
outrage, and to the voicing of socio-political claims, military or police interventions are 
undertaken to defend the disturbed concessions and to uphold concretely the conditions for the 
exercise of exploitation of prerogatives.”  Dufresne, supra note 7, at 336. 
 71. Miranda, supra note 44, at 136. 
 72. See SRSG Report, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
 Because the 
discourse has focused on second-tier human rights violations, it has been 
framed largely as an issue of corporate social responsibility, focusing on 
human rights principles. As a result, emerging legal remedies have provided 
little opportunity to address first-tier property violations, the root cause of 
the problem. 
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III. PROTECTION GAPS IN THE EMERGING ACCOUNTABILITY 
REGIME: THE LIMITED JURISDICTIONAL GRANT OF THE 
ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT 
The emerging legal architecture that is being erected under the umbrella 
of a corporate social responsibility regime represents a crucial step forward 
in addressing the egregious violations that have occurred at the hands of 
extractive industries.73 In the United States, the ATCA provides a civil 
human rights remedy, giving federal courts original jurisdiction over civil 
actions brought by aliens for torts that qualify as a violation of the law of 
nations.74 Similarly, the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) 
establishes civil liability, irrespective of citizenship, for any individual who, 
under the authority of a foreign nation, subjects another to torture or 
extrajudicial killings.75 While statutory instruments such as the ATCA and 
the TVPA have provided innovative legal remedies to address human rights 
violations in federal courts,76 courts have narrowly construed their 
jurisdiction to extend to a limited set of abuses.77
While the ATCA opened the door for federal courts to adjudicate 
certain violations recognized under international law,
 The end result is that 
courts can address a limited set of second-tier human rights abuses and are 
circumscribed, if not explicitly prohibited, from reaching first-tier property 
rights violations within this statutory framework. 
78 it remained unclear 
which acts constituted violations of the law of nations. Subsequent case law 
has played a central role in clarifying the breadth of applicable violations. 
In Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,79 a physician in Paraguay brought suit under the 
ATCA against the former Inspector General of Police in Paraguay for 
torturing his son in retaliation for his political opposition to the government 
of President Alfredo Stroessner.80 The Second Circuit found perpetration of 
torture in an official capacity sufficient to grant federal jurisdiction.81 In 
granting jurisdiction, the court in Filártiga nonetheless read the ATCA as 
providing narrow jurisdiction to adjudicate only a margin of acceptable 
claims involving “well-established, universally recognized norms of 
international law.”82
                                                                                                                 
 73. See Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement 
Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 188 (2002). 
 74. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 75. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 76. See Collingsworth, supra note 73, at 188. 
 77. See Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic 
Litigation, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 401 405–06 (2001). 
 78. See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 79. See generally id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 888. 
 82. Id. 
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In Doe v. Unocal Corp.,83 where Burmese farmers in the Tenasserim 
region brought suit against Unocal challenging the Yadana gas pipeline 
project, the district court reiterated adherence to the high threshold set by 
the Second Circuit in Filártiga.84 As discussed, farmers alleged that the 
conduct of Unocal and its local subsidiary had resulted in forced 
displacement, confiscation of property, forced labor and torture.85 Rejecting 
the expropriation claims, the court found that claims of torture and forced 
labor constituted violations of the laws of nations, triggering federal 
jurisdiction under the ATCA.86 Building upon the Second Circuit’s 
important precedent, the court found that even absent state conduct, private 
enterprise could be held liable because the allegation of forced labor fell 
within the set of crimes “for which the law of nations attributes individual 
responsibility.”87 While the court’s interpretation of the law of nations 
extended the ATCA’s applicability to private enterprises, it stopped short of 
extending such applicability to private rights.88
This distinction between private and public rights was previously 
emphasized by the Second Circuit in Dreyfus v. von Finck.
 
89 In Dreyfus, the 
court dismissed a complaint brought by a Swiss citizen seeking recovery 
against citizens of West Germany on claims of “wrongful confiscation of 
property in Nazi Germany in 1938.”90 The court found that “[d]efendants’ 
conduct, tortious though it may have been, was not a violation of the law of 
nations, which governs civilized states in their dealings with each other.”91 
Here, the court suggested that violations of the law of nations did not 
encompass violations of private rights. Similarly, in Bigio v. Coca-Cola, the 
Second Circuit found that Canadian citizens had not established subject 
matter jurisdiction under the ATCA in alleging that a Delaware corporation 
had purchased or leased property knowing that it had been unlawfully 
seized by the Egyptian government based on religious discrimination.92
                                                                                                                 
 83. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 84. Id. at 883, 891–92. 
 85. Id. at 883. 
 86. Id. at 884. 
 87. Id. at 891–92. The Second Circuit had previously held that “the ATCA reaches the conduct 
of private parties provided that their conduct is undertaken under the color of state authority or 
violates a norm of international law that is recognized as extending to the conduct of private 
parties.”  Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Kadic v. 
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239–40, 245 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 88. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 884 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 89. Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (Plaintiff was forced to leave Germany 
and sold his interest in Dreyfus. He alleged that the transaction took place under duress with the 
price substantially lower than the actual value of the stock.). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 31. 
 92. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 444, 447 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 The 
court found that a corporation could not be held responsible for a state’s 
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“discriminatory expropriation of property,” and that such conduct did not 
amount to an act “of universal concern.”93
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
 
94 the Supreme Court confirmed this 
closed-door approach,95 cautioning against “adapting the law of nations to 
private rights” in the absence of congressional action.96 Because courts 
retain only a narrow margin of discretion in interpreting violations of 
international law, they often have limited or no jurisdiction over these 
initial first-tier violations.97 As Beth Stephens notes, “human rights and 
humanitarian law violations such as genocide, summary execution, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, disappearance, slavery and forced 
labor trigger jurisdiction under the ATCA,” whereas other claims, such as 
those “based on expropriation of property,” fall outside this jurisdiction.98
In addition to their narrow interpretation of acts constituting violations 
of the law of nations, courts have also inferred particular bars to 
adjudicating the validity of foreign conduct. The act of state doctrine, which 
suggests that “the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own 
jurisdiction . . . be deemed valid,” is one basis on which to argue against 
judicial interference with respect to foreign conduct.
 
Because this statutory scheme extends only to a small margin of violations 
that have achieved the level of international consensus, it falls short of 
addressing the wide range of property violations that often set the stage for 
second-tier human rights violations worthy of jurisdiction under the ATCA. 
99 Although the scope 
of this doctrine remains unclear, some have found that judicial interference 
is valid up until the point where “adjudication of the matter will bring the 
nation into hostile confrontation with the foreign state.”100 In Unocal, the 
court did not find that this line had been crossed with regards to allegations 
of torture and forced labor because the U.S. government had already 
criticized Burma for its human rights abuses and it was therefore “hard to 
imagine how judicial consideration of the matter [would] so substantially 
exacerbate relations as to cause ‘hostile confrontation.’”101
                                                                                                                 
 93. Id. at 448. 
 94. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004) (Humberto Alvarez-Machain, who 
was indicted for the torture and murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) official and 
later acquitted, challenged his abduction in Mexico under a plan authorized by the DEA using 
Mexican nationals to seize him and bring him to the United States). 
 95. Id. at 725. The court found that that prohibitions against arbitrary arrest also fell short of 
the ATCA’s requirements. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 509 F.3d 148, (2d Cir. 2007). 
 98. Stephens, supra note 77, at 405–06. 
 99. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 893 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. The court additionally reasoned that: 
 Because 
[B]ecause nations do not, and cannot under international law, claim a right to torture or 
enslave their own citizens, a finding that a nation has committed such acts, particularly 
where, as here, that finding comports with the prior conclusions of the coordinate 
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consideration of whether a state is acting in the public interest factors into 
this doctrine, considerably more deference is afforded to states 
expropriating land as opposed to committing torture.102 It has been argued, 
for example, that “‘instructing a foreign sovereign to alter its chosen means 
of allocating and profiting from its own valuable natural resources’ would 
affront the sovereignty of a state.”103 Because state land expropriations can 
be justified, often pretextually, on public interest grounds in a way that 
torture cannot, such expropriations fall more easily within the deferential 
act of state doctrine,104
While the ATCA provides an important opportunity to hold 
corporations liable for violations of international law, its narrow 
jurisdictional grant coupled with limiting principles such as the act of state 
doctrine leaves substantial gaps, if not barriers, in terms of preventative 
remedies. In the case of Burma, property claims were expressly preempted 
and the local community had to rely on traditional human rights claims to 
assert their rights. Similarly in Nigeria, petitioners in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co. alleged first-tier violations, claiming that Shell Nigeria 
“coercively appropriated land for oil development without adequate 
compensation, and caused substantial pollution of the air and water in the 
homeland of the Ogoni people.”
 further limiting judicial determinations of first-tier 
violations. 
105 Their claim, however, also hinged 
primarily on allegations that Shell Nigeria orchestrated attacks involving 
torture and extrajudicial killings to suppress local opposition to drilling in 
the region.106 The Second Circuit’s focus on petitioners’ claims of torture 
and extrajudicial killings in rejecting the corporations’ forum non 
conveniens claims107
Given the private nature of property rights in the United States and the 
deference afforded to states in land appropriations, it seems improbable that 
courts will be able to address land expropriations under this framework, 
absent torture or extrajudicial killings. Despite the groundbreaking 
achievements of recent litigation under the ATCA, the statute’s limitations 
in the context of underlying property violations suggest that while it has 
become a necessary remedy, it remains an insufficient one. The increasing 
 further suggests that under the ATCA, first tier 
property rights will only be addressed indirectly insofar as they result in 
second-tier human rights claims. 
                                                                                                                 
branches of government, should have no detrimental effect on the polices underlying 
the act of the state doctrine. 
Id. at 884. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (quoting Lui v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
 104. Unocal Corp, 963 F. Supp. at 893. 
 105. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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promotion of a social and economic rights approach will serve as one way 
of further incorporating property principles within the realm of public 
protections. However, the lack of substantial consensus in this area suggests 
that, in the short-run, the responsibility for protecting private rights may rest 
more appropriately in the private sphere. 
IV. CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY’S DIVORCE FROM 
TRADITIONAL FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES 
In identifying private remedies for private rights violations, the key 
starting point is to determine whether corporations carry out their extractive 
operations in developing countries in a manner consistent with their key 
governance principles. In prioritizing principles of voluntary ownership and 
contracting, U.S. corporations adhere generally to a shareholder primacy 
model, under which the corporation serves primarily to maximize the 
shareholder’s profits.108
Corporate contracts with unrepresentative regimes violate three free 
market principles underlying shareholder primacy: (1) informed and 
voluntary contracting; (2) the separation of economic power and political 
authority; and (3) the centrality of private property protections.
 In assessing the use of this model in the context of 
natural resource extractions in weak governance zones, it becomes 
immediately evident that corporations have, to some extent, abandoned 
precisely the principles governing ownership and contracting that justified a 
shareholder primacy approach in the first place. 
109
A. THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY MODEL 
 This free 
market contradiction creates problematic distortions in the corporation’s 
role, often turning the corporation into a political actor and the local 
community into an involuntary investor. Where such distortions emerge, 
corporations can no longer rely on shareholder primacy to justify their 
conduct until such conduct is reconciled with the free market principles that 
justified shareholder primacy to begin with. 
Under the prevailing shareholder primacy model of corporate 
governance, shareholders are collectively perceived, by virtue of their 
                                                                                                                 
 108. Under a shareholder primacy model of corporate governance, the corporate entity serves 
first and foremost to promote the interests of shareholders. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder 
Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 277–78 (1998); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad 
Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1189–90 (2002). 
 109. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1990, available at http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res= 
F10F11FB3E5810718EDDAA0994D1405B808BF1D3&scp=1&sq=the%20social%20responsibil
ity%20of%20business%20is%20to%20increase%20its%20profits&st=cse (subscription required) 
[hereinafter The Social Responsibility of Business]. 
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investments, as the owners of the corporation,110 while the corporation is 
often perceived as “a nexus of contracts” between managers, shareholders 
and other constituents.111 Property protection and voluntary contracting are 
thus two central principles underlying corporate governance.112 Because 
shareholders are the owners, the corporation must be “primarily run for 
[their] pecuniary benefit,”113 serving to protect their investments and 
maximize shareholder wealth.114 Under this scheme, managers are 
frequently prevented or discouraged from acting in the interest of non-
shareholder constituencies unless doing so would be in the best interests of 
the shareholders themselves.115
Because equity owners give decision-making authority to corporate 
agents, their expectation of profit maximization is protected by a system of 
fiduciary duty. In what Antoine Rebérioux refers to as a “philosophy of 
dispossession,” shareholders, who must vest control in corporate 
 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Antoine Rebérioux, Shareholder Primacy and Managerial Accountability, Comparative 
Research in Law and Political Economy, CLPE Research Paper 1/2007 Vol. 03, No. 01, 1 (2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=961290. The dynamics of the shareholder primacy model are 
described by Milton Friedman as follows: 
In a free-enterprise, private property system, a corporate executive is an employee of 
the owners of the business. He has a direct responsibility to his employers. That 
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which 
generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic 
rules of the society, both those embodied in the law and those embodied in ethical 
custom. 
The Social Responsibility of Business, supra note 109. 
 111. Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: a Proposed Corporate 
Regime that Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587, 592 
(1997). 
 112. Id. at 590–94. 
 113. Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, 
and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1278–83 (1991). 
 114. Rebérioux, supra note 110, at 2; see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=94043 (for an analysis of the benefits of a shareholder profit 
maximization approach). 
 115. The extent of the doctrine’s protections of shareholder interest at the cost of managerial 
discretion was illustrated in the Michigan Supreme Court’s ruling in Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Company. Where shareholders sought to compel seventy-five percent of the company’s cash 
surplus against the director’s decision to reinvest profits into the company, the court found that 
refusal to pay special dividends did not fall within a director’s discretion and thus constituted an 
arbitrary refusal. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 510 (1919). The court reasoned 
that: 
[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of 
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The 
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end. . .it is 
not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of 
a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary 
purpose of benefiting others . . . . 
Id. at 507. 
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executives, counter their dispossession by retaining some influence over 
managers’ decision-making.116 Managers are held to a “triad of primary 
fiduciary duties:”117 duties of due care, loyalty, and good faith.118 This triad 
essentially requires directors to act in the best interest of the corporation, 
refrain from self-dealing, and remain honest.119 Where there is a conflict of 
interest with other constituencies of the corporation, shareholder interests 
generally prevail.120
As discussed, the shareholder primacy model is premised on the 




In an ideal free market resting on private property, no individual can 
coerce any other, all cooperation is voluntary, all parties to such 
cooperation benefit or they need not participate. There are no values, no 
“social” responsibilities in any sense other than the shared values and 
responsibilities of individuals.
 Milton Friedman has identified the key set of 
free market principles underlying the corporate form as follows: 
122
Irrespective of broader social responsibilities, the principles underlying 
corporate governance implicate a political or legal regime, or what will be 
referred to here as corporate free market responsibility. As explained by 
Friedman, this regime provides a series of interconnected underlying 
assumptions and individual protections: (1) informed and voluntary 
contracting and on some voluntary exit;
 
123 (2) the separation of economic 
power and political authority, which if consolidated adds a coercive element 
that can delegitimize the voluntary nature of a transaction;124 and (3) private 
property protections, which rest definition of property rights.125
                                                                                                                 
 116. Rebérioux, supra note 110, at 5. 
 117. Williams, supra note 19, at 88 (citing Malone v. Brincat, 772 A.2d 5, 12–13 (Del. 1998)). 
 118. A general duty of disclosure is encompassed in the triad requiring directors to “provide the 
stockholders with accurate and complete information material to a transaction or other corporate 
event that is being presented to them for action.”  Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998). 
See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: A Corporate Director’s 
Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAN. L. REV. 1087, 1100 (1996). 
 119. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30(a) (2002). 
 120. Smith, supra note 108, at 282 (citing David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: 
Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, Progressive Corporate Law 35, 1 (Lawrence E. Mitchell 
ed., 1995)). In the context of corporate takeovers, states have adopted nonshareholder 
constituencies statutes that allow managers to take into account the interests of customers, 
suppliers and employees in determining the interest of the corporation. Id. at 289. 
 121. Leung, supra note 111, at 590–94. 
 122. The Social Responsibility of Business, supra note 109. 
 123. Id. 
 124. CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 2, at 115–16. 
 125. Id. at 27. 
 While the 
shareholder primacy model is premised on these three free market 
principles, the legitimacy of the model is called into question when 
corporations engage in unaccountable extractions that stray from these 
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underpinnings. In such a context, these principles, while maintained with 
regard to shareholders, do not extend to local communities, whose interests 
often go unprotected by both the government and the corporation. As a 
result, contracts between a corporation and a foreign government deny local 
landowners of their property absent voluntary contracting and under 
substantial coercion. This gap in protection calls into question the 
legitimacy of a contract that uses coercive means in the name of the free 
market. In order to better address this gap, it is necessary to explore each of 
these free market principles and the ways in which corporations have 
diverged from them by engaging in unaccountable extractions. 
1. Not-So-Voluntary Contracting 
Generally, transaction costs will be too high for a corporation to 
contract with individual communities,126 so instead the corporation 
contracts with the government, which retains sovereignty over the country’s 
natural resources.127 Because government officials contract on behalf of 
their country’s citizens, the voluntary nature of that contract does not 
depend solely on whether the officials entered into the contract voluntarily, 
but on whether they did so as a matter of public welfare as opposed to 
personal gain.128 Certain public harms that result from government 
contracts may be justified as products of a representative political process 
that is meant to facilitate fair distribution of public costs and benefits.129
                                                                                                                 
 126. See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 54–56 (6th ed. 2002). 
 127. ECOSOC Report on Indigenous Peoples, supra note 52, at 5. 
 128. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has increasingly held corporations 
accountable for bribing state officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In 2006, the SEC 
entered final judgment against corporate employees operating in Nigeria for paying approximately 
one million dollars in bribes to Nigerian government officials in pursuit of a contract for an oil 
drilling project. Margaret Ayres, John Davis, Nicole Healy & Alexandria Wrage, Developments in 
U.S. and International Efforts to Prevent Corruption, 41 INT’L LAW 597, 600–01 (Summer 2007). 
The parties were charged civil monetary penalties. Id. Additionally, the SEC also brought a civil 
action against a former employee of Willbros, a public oilfield services company, for bribery 
schemes in Nigeria and Ecuador. Id. at 602. 
 129. As Bruce Ackerman notes, “welfare gains can rarely be purchased without social cost—
though many may gain, some will lose as a result of the new governmental initiative.” BRUCE A. 
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (1977). In the United States, the 
Constitution’s Takings Clause has been designed particularly to address problems of equitable 
distribution and potential misuse of eminent domain, requiring that property be taken only for 
public use and with just compensation. While the legal interpretations of these two requirements 
are complex, their mere existence, indicates that the government does not retain complete 
discretion when it takes property. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation”). As Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky note: 
“Assuming that democratic mechanisms make public officials accountable for budget 
management, compensation is important to create a budgetary effect that forces governments to 
internalize the costs that their decisions impose on private resource holders.” Abraham Bell & 
Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 580 (2001). 
 In 
the case of unrepresentative regimes, however, a bilateral arrangement 
between a corporation and the government that is voluntary and informed 
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with respect to the government is generally not voluntary and informed with 
respect to the people living on the land or in the surrounding area, as 
illustrated in both Colombia and Burma.130 In each of these cases, the 
contract was made by the corporation in pursuit of investor interests, 
whereas the local populations, whose land was a crucial investment in the 
venture, had no opportunity for voluntary choice.131 They were not 
contracted with directly, they were not represented or compensated by the 
contracting government, and their property interests were not accounted for 
by the corporation itself.132
Under contract law, “[f]reedom of will is essential to the validity of an 
agreement.”
 
133 A contract will be invalidated in cases of duress or undue 
influence, where such free will is compromised.134 The circumstances of 
unaccountable extractions are analogous given that the absence of free will 
is actually more exaggerated: certain groups are not only intimidated but 
completely excluded from the process.135 A corporation should therefore 
seriously reconsider the legitimacy of its contracts with an unrepresentative 
regime when it has reasonable grounds to believe that state contractors were 
not acting within the best interests of affected communities.136 Neglect of 
accountability gaps has led to costly malfunctions such as violent protests 
and repressive state activity, often in the form of human rights abuses, 
including torture, forced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and extrajudicial 
killings.137
2. The Corporation as a Political Entity 
 These forms of state abuse are further exacerbated where 
corporate influence dictates further consolidation and concentration of 
political and economic power. 
The corporation’s pursuit of shareholder interests becomes further 
divorced from free market principles where corporate activity is politicized, 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See discussion supra Part II. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. 17A AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 218 (2008). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See discussion supra Part II on the exclusion of interested parties in Odioma, Nigeria. 
 136. In analyzing odious debt, for example, Thomas Palley has argued that: 
[an] important measure for guarding against looting via financial markets is the legal 
doctrine of odious debt. The core idea is that where: (1) loans are made to illegitimate 
regimes, such as those that come to power undemocratically; (2) loans are not secured 
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conditions . . . then such loans can be deemed illegitimate and unenforceable. 
Thomas I. Palley, Lifting the Natural Resource Curse, FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL (Dec. 2003), 
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/generaldebate/2003/12curse.htm. 
 137. HRW NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 14, 164. 
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threatening a coercive consolidation of political and economic power.138
[By] removing the organization of economic activity from the control of 
political authority, the market eliminates this source of coercive power. It 
enables economic strength to be a check to political power rather than a 
reinforcement * * * if economic power is kept in separate hands from 




This approach, while minimizing government involvement, is not 
meant to eliminate it.
 
140 Instead, it designates the government as an 
essential “umpire to interpret and enforce the rules decided on” and to 
accordingly “minimize the extent to which government need participate 
directly in the game.”141 In the United States, government protections come 
in various forms, from state and federal regulations to protections of private 
property under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.142
The separation of economic and political authority, crucial to 
Friedman’s competitive capitalist regime, breaks down when corporations 
contract with non-representative governments to serve a security function. 
Both corporations and local governments have incentives to preempt the 
development of legal infrastructure that may inhibit the scope of their 
operations.
 
143 Government leaders, who are not required to distribute 
revenues, stand to gain substantial profits irrespective of whether the local 
communities sustain substantial losses.144 Therefore, corporations 
frequently have incentives to bribe state actors in pursuit of their goals.145 
Corporations cease being purely economic entities where their profits 
depend, in part, on being able to operate in economies uninhibited by the 
rule of law and where they use their economic power to preempt the state 
from evolving into Friedman’s regulating “umpire.”146
Corporations further blur the line by interfering in local conflict 
dynamics when they recruit government security forces, which may already 
be in conflict with other local factions.
 
147
                                                                                                                 
 138. 1000 corporations produce eighty percent of the world industrial output. Blankenburg, 
supra note 1. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
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available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/corpwatch.org/downloads/top200.pdf. 
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 144. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
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 146. See generally Collier & Hoeffler, supra note 143. 
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 As financial contributors, they 
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may empower one side of a domestic conflict in pursuit of shareholder 
profits.148
The involvement of oil companies in internal violence reaches a more 
significant level when rebels, in order to counter the empowerment of 
governments that have contracted with oil corporations, directly attack oil 
concessions or pipelines. Then, rather than being simply part of the 
working conditions of a larger system that—to a certain and not 
insignificant degree—oil companies can claim not to control, their 
activities become directly involved in the dynamics of internal violence. In 
a sense, the defense of pipelines and of oil concessions is the material 
threshold that defeats the oil companies’ argument that they are 
uninvolved in conflicts and merely carrying out commercial interaction.
 The corporation’s purely commercial role is undermined when it 
contracts with one side of a party to an internal conflict for the protection of 
a pipeline in a way that alters the conflict dynamics. As Robert Dufresne 
notes: 
149
In Sudan, for example, revenues earned by the government in 
Khartoum through contracts with companies such as Chevron contributed to 
the government’s weapons stockpile.
 
150 As “participants in the web of local 
interactions,” corporations become “a means for the pursuit of local 
political objectives.”151
3. Private Property Protections and Dispossession of the 
Involuntary Investor 
 Taking a place within the military web politicizes 
corporate activity. 
In failing to take into account the social realities of extracting resources 
from countries with unrepresentative and unaccountable political 
infrastructure, corporate governance structures facilitate exactly the type of 
consolidation of political and economic power that the free market system 
seeks to avoid. The absence of voluntary contracting, coupled with the 
coercive nature of corporate conduct, severely undermines the legitimacy of 
the corporation’s interference with local property interests. 
By sidestepping local property interests in pursuit of profit 
maximization, the shareholder primacy model of corporate governance 
prioritizes the protection of property interests linked to formal investments 
(shareholder interests) while blindly discounting the property interests 
linked to other corporate assets (local community interests). Shareholders 
may argue that where local property protections are lacking, it is the 
responsibility of the state and not the corporation to account for them. In 
this case, however, it is the corporation and not the foreign regime that 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Dufresne, supra note 7, at 344. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 341. 
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bases the legitimacy of its conduct on respect for ownership and voluntary 
contracting. Placing the burden on the state ultimately reduces free market 
principles to a principle of double standards.152
The shareholder primacy model, in placing a premium on investor 
interests, incorrectly presumes that the unaccountable state is a valid 
transactional partner and that the absence of formal property rights 
extinguishes the need to recognize such rights. However, property 
ownership, which is a basic foundation of the shareholder primacy model, 
has historically been “viewed as establishing the economic basis for 
freedom from governmental coercion and the enjoyment of liberty.”
 
153 For 
example, in the United States, constitutional checks on self-interested 
governmental takings have been put in place under the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, which requires that property be taken only for a 
public use and in exchange for just compensation.154 The Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process clause places an additional check, which, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, prohibits arbitrary and unreasonable 
deprivations of property.155 These protections of private property do not 
exist in a vacuum, but rather are grounded in a representative system of 
government.156
In the case of unaccountable extractions, such checks are lacking. The 
contract is frequently motivated by self-interest, excludes the interests of 
the local communities, and is particularly coercive in nature.
  
157 Government 
officials, acting on their own behalf, often pocket the profits from the 
contract.158
                                                                                                                 
 152. Mark Gibney and R. David Emerick, The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law 
and the Protection of Human Rights: Hold Multinational Corporations to Domestic and 
International Standards, 10 TEMP. INT’L COMP. L.J. 123, 145 (1996) (“There is one set of 
standards—legal and moral—in domestic operations; but a completely different and much lower 
set of standards when these same entities are operating abroad, particularly in much poorer 
countries. This dichotomy is wrong, and the governments in the industrialized world have the 
means of preventing it; by applying extraterritorially many of the domestic and international 
standards that are adopted and enforced at home.”). 
 153. Ely, supra note 142, at 3. 
 154. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 155. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 
(1926) (“it must be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such 
provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare”). 
 156. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (setting forth election standards and process for the House of 
Representatives, who are to be chosen “by the People of the several States”); U.S. CONST. amend. 
XVII (setting forth election standards and process for the Senate). 
 157. HRW NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, 8–9. 
 158. See Douglas Anele, Nigeria: On Obasanjo and His Critics, VANGUARD, Mar. 20, 2008, 
http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200803240161.html. 
 The corporation’s use of that property in these cases is no 
different than a coercive taking or an arbitrary deprivation of property on 
behalf of the corporation and the government. Thus, while the Second 
Circuit in Bigio may not have found that a U.S. corporation utilizing 
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unlawfully expropriated land had violated the law of nations, the 
corporation had nonetheless violated its own free market principles. 
Additionally, the shareholder primacy model fails to reconcile the role 
of involuntary investors. In the context of unaccountable extractions, the 
local community takes on the anomalous role of an involuntary investor. 
Antoine Rebérioux’s “philosophy of dispossession,” as applied to the 
shareholder, can be applied in an exaggerated form to the local community, 
which is dispossessed of its property without initial approval and without 
retaining control.159 Ironically, the corporation accounts for this 
dispossession with regard to shareholders by prioritizing shareholder 
interests160 in a way that simultaneously facilitates a corresponding and 
somewhat perverse form of dispossession of local communities. To 
reconcile this paradox, fiduciary duty must be reconceptualized to eliminate 
the anomaly of the involuntary investor and ensure free market 
responsibility. While this reconciliation is important on a conceptual level, 
it also serves to address the monetary, reputational, and legitimacy costs 
that tend to result when property violations lead to destabilizing and violent 
unrest.161 Free market fairness principles are not simply a social construct 
or moral imperative but rather a practical recognition that unfairness often 
sparks violence, and violence can be costly.162
V. CORPORATE FREE MARKET RESPONSIBILITY: 
RECONCILING CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO 
ACCOUNT FOR THE INVOLUNTARY INVESTOR 
 
A corporation’s failure to take into account the costs and risks of doing 
business with unaccountable regimes can result in unaccounted and 
substantial costs to involuntary investors in the form of security costs, lower 
growth prospects, and changes to planned investments.163 Recognition of 
this reality requires reconsideration of corporate fiduciary duty as applied in 
the context of unaccountable extractions. As John Ruggie has warned, 
“[h]istory demonstrates that without adequate institutional underpinnings 
markets will fail to deliver their full benefits and may even become socially 
unsustainable.”164
                                                                                                                 
 159. See discussion supra Part II. 
 160. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 161. Deborah Rhode, Profits and Professionalism, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 49, 54–55 (2005). 
 162. In the Warri region, oil companies originally reached an agreement with the Itsekiri leader, 
ignoring ownership claims of the Ijaw and Urhobo. AI NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 9. Based 
on the ensuing violence surrounding the oil installations, Chevron has sustained substantial 
financial losses estimated at up to $500 million. Id. at 14. 
 163. Id. 
 164. SRSG Report, supra note 3, at 3 (citing John McMillan, REINVENTING THE BAZAAR: A 
NATURAL HISTORY OF MARKETS (2002)). John Ruggie is currently the U.N. Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transitional corporations 
and other business enterprises. Id. at 1. 
 Corporations acting in weak governance zones must 
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account for the absence of the requisite free market institutional parameters, 
both for the purposes of securing the value of their investments, but also to 
secure the validity of the free market approach on which their conduct is 
premised. Where corporations choose to engage in natural resource 
extractions, they must balance against the risk of contracting with 
unaccountable regimes by broadening directors’ fiduciary duties. Such a 
balancing must encompass a duty of due diligence with regard to the rights 
and interests of otherwise unrepresented local communities so as to 
eliminate the problematic phenomena of involuntary investments.165
It is worth noting that the complexity of local property interests may 
indeed be insurmountable and the suggested approach is not considered a 
catch-all solution. Under the current framework, however, problems ensue 
not simply due to the complexity of local interests, but rather from 
recklessness on behalf of corporations, which fail to perform due diligence 
to better understand the environment in which they are working. Classic 
mistakes include the failure to take into account communal conflict over 
landownership and to compensate the full range of property owners who 
have interests at stake.
 
166
A. CURRENT APPROACHES AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS 
 
Courts have recognized the need for corporations to adapt to account 
for their changing role within society and various models have been 
proposed for considering broader corporate stakeholders.167  Some courts 
have chosen to interpret managerial discretion as encompassing greater 
flexibility to incorporate the interests of other stakeholders.168 Similarly, the 
“mediating hierarchy model” suggests that granting directors broader 
discretion to favor other constituencies actually benefits shareholders’ long-
term interests.169
                                                                                                                 
 165. While the primary duty may rest with the state, this burden shifts in part to the corporation 
where its actions help preempt the emergence of states capable of upholding this duty. 
 166. Violence in Odioma, for example, can be linked to a dispute between neighboring 
communities over control of land sought for oil exploration. Shell Nigeria’s identification of only 
one constituency at the cost of others exacerbated local tensions. AI NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 
7, at 4. 
 167. In A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, the Supreme Court of New Jersey validated a 
corporation’s power to make contributions to academic institutions, recognizing the changing 
corporate role: 
When the wealth of the nation was primarily in the hands of individuals they discharged 
their responsibilities as citizens . . . with the transfer of wealth to corporate hands and 
the imposition of heavy burdens of individual taxation, they have been unable to keep 
pace with increased philanthropic needs. They have therefore, with justification, turned 
to corporations to assume the modern obligations of good citizenship. 
A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N. J. 145, 153 (1953). 
 168. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173 (1968). 
 169. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247, 297 (1999). 
 However, the interests served are still limited to “members 
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of the corporate coalition” such as shareholders, employees, and 
creditors.170
Other constituency statutes authorize directors to exercise similar 
discretion. The Pennsylvania statute defining fiduciary duty, for example, 
allows directors “in considering the best interests of the corporation” to 
“consider the effects of any action . . . upon communities in which offices 
or other establishments of the corporation are located.”
 
171 This has allowed 
certain states to account for interests of broader constituencies. These 
approaches, however, do not require corporations to take such interests into 
account, imposing no duties and no liability.172
A more compelling and relevant example is the extension of fiduciary 
duties to controlling shareholders. Analogizing their influence to the control 




Important steps have already been taken towards this end in 
reconceptualizing not only corporate stakeholders but also the extent of 
directors’ fiduciary duties. Cynthia Williams and John Conley, for example, 
argue that “directors’ fiduciary duties now include a duty to be aware of 
human rights risks and potential violations within a company’s global 
operations, and to develop policies and management procedures to reduce 
the risks of such violations.”
 If we similarly analogize the involuntary investments of 
local communities to the voluntary investments of shareholders, it is unclear 
why a parallel extension of rights should not apply to involuntary investors. 
174 This expanded notion of fiduciary duty, 
however, remains a duty to traditional shareholders and a duty geared more 
strongly towards second-tier human rights violations instead of first-tier 
property rights violations. Friedman himself has emphasized that 
corporations that invest in communities in which they are working or 
improving local government in order to “lessen losses from pilferage and 
sabotage” are not acting under a social responsibility, but rather upholding 
community interests when they serve the best interests of the 
corporations.175 Here, it is not argued that an expanded fiduciary duty is 
owed to shareholders, but that a parallel fiduciary duty is owed to local 
communities who, in the context of unaccountable extractions, retain a 
status analogous to shareholders.176
                                                                                                                 
 170. Id. at 305. 
 171. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1716 (2006). 
 172. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717 (2006). 
 173. See Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Del. 1994) (The 
court has held that “a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty . . . if it owns a majority interest in or 
exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation.”). 
 174. Williams, supra note 19, at 87. 
 175. The Social Responsibility of Business, supra note 109. 
 176. See supra Part IV. 
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B. A FIDUCIARY DUTY OF DUE DILIGENCE 
The extension of a fiduciary duty of care stems from reasoning 
underlying the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Fiduciary principles of loyalty 
apply: “[W]here a person who is empowered to manage the property of 
others for their benefit uses such property for personal benefit. In modern 
corporation law, such self-dealing behavior, while not flatly forbidden, is 
subject to the most searching degree of judicial scrutiny.”177
A corporation engaged in natural resource extractions frequently uses 
the property of local communities for the benefit of shareholders without 
paying adequate or any compensation.
 
178 In such cases, the interests of 
formal shareholders may conflict with those of the involuntary investors 
and the transaction should be subject to rigid scrutiny. The transaction, held 
to an entire fairness standard, should ensure fair dealing and a fair price for 
all investors.179 A corporation that initiates a Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOU)180
The remedy may be equally assessed within the framework of the duty 
of care. In Francis v. United Jersey Bank, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
defined a director’s duty of care as encompassing an obligation to maintain 
a rudimentary understanding of the business of the corporation, keep 
informed of corporate activities, and monitor corporate affairs and 
policies.
 that promises local development to a local community should be 
bound by that contract based on a principled free market duty to act in good 
faith. 
181 It reasoned that “[t]he sentinel asleep at his post contributes 
nothing to the enterprise he is charged to protect.”182 Accordingly, 
“[s]hareholders have the right to expect that directors will exercise 
reasonable supervision and control over the policies and practices of the 
corporation.”183 For example, directors are required to make reasonable 
attempts to prevent misappropriation of corporate funds.184
                                                                                                                 
 177. Hamermesh, supra note 118, at 1100. 
 178. See supra Part II. 
 179. See generally Hamermesh, supra note 118. 
 180. AI NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 4. 
 181. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 31–32 (1981). 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id. at 32. 
 184. Id. 
 Extending the 
scope of this duty to require corporations to obtain greater understanding of 
the community contexts and communal property interests in the areas in 
which they operate serves both corporate interests and local community 
interests. Corporations that seek oil exploration contracts and take into 
account competing tribal claims to land may circumvent some of the 
conflict that will later threaten the stability of their operations. 
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While corporations often agree to adhere to voluntary principles that 
require them to take into account local conditions,185 they nevertheless 
continue to fail to report human rights violations, scrutinize aggressive 
actions on behalf of security forces, and ensure adequate training of security 
forces.186 Therefore, the parameters of corporate conduct in weak 
governance zones should be more strongly circumscribed within the 
framework of corporate fiduciary duty, drawing from existing approaches to 
fiduciary duty as well as existing soft law mechanisms.187 In a recent 
article, Cynthia Williams and John Conley point to the Delaware Chancery 
Court’s decision in In re Caremark Derivative Litigation, noting that courts 
have put “systems in place” to guard against certain risks.188
Additionally, the performance standards established by the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), which are required of corporations seeking IFC 
investment funds, provide a useful framework for such a concrete 
system.
 Accordingly, 
corporations could require systematic use of certain processes. The MOU is 
an important starting point so long as corporations are held to a good faith 
standard. 
189 These standards include impact assessments with human rights 
elements and community consultation with compliance subject to review by 
an ombudsman who may hear complaints from those adversely affected.190
                                                                                                                 
 185. Corporations like Chevron Nigeria are often signatories of the Voluntary Principles for 
Security and Human Rights, which provide human rights guideposts for companies in their 
operations. AI NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 4. 
 186. Id. at 8. 
 187. Soft law mechanisms refer to normative guidelines for operational standard setting and 
accountability procedures—“global administrative rulemaking.” SRSG Report, supra note 3, at 
16. 
 188. Williams, supra note 19, at 88. 
 189. SRSG Report, supra note 3, at 15. 
 190. Id. 
 
Using the IFC standards as a structure, corporations operating in weak 
governance zones should be required to put in place a system that applies 
impact assessments and community consultations. The purpose of such a 
system is to gauge the impact of their operations on local communities and 
to account for their needs so as to address first-tier property violations and 
circumvent second-tier rights violations and their associated costs. Finally, 
corporations should be held to certain monitoring requirements assessing 
the ongoing rights implications of their operations and reporting on any 
violations of such rights. The purpose of such reports would not simply be 
to highlight human rights abuses, but to indicate to what extent the 
corporation is accounting for local interests and maintaining its free market 
responsibilities. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Irrespective of broader social responsibilities, the principles underlying 
corporate governance implicate a certain type of political or legal regime 
with at least minimal regulatory protections of individual freedom. The 
absence of these underlying elements in unaccountable extractions calls into 
question the legitimacy of corporate contracts in these regions. While recent 
litigation under the ATCA is providing important opportunities for legal 
redress in response to the most egregious human rights violations, existing 
mechanisms fall short of reaching first-tier property violations. Thus, a 
corresponding solution is necessary to address these violations and 
reconcile shareholder primacy with free market principles. A cynical 
response to such an approach may be that seeking a greater degree of 
accountability in the contracting process would be prohibitively expensive 
and is outside the role of the corporation.191 However, by avoiding 
responsibilities to local communities, corporations create additional 
settlement costs, reputational costs, and risks in terms of the security and 
stability of corporations’ natural resource operations.192
Slowly, corporations are being forced to face their free market 
responsibilities. In 2002, a group of female protestors demanding 
employment opportunities and investment in local communities occupied 
an oil terminal owned by Chevron Nigeria.
 
193 The occupation halted 
production of an estimated 500,000 barrels of oil per day.194
Seher Khawaja
 Exchanging 
such costs with a broadly conceptualized fiduciary duty may serve as a 
more legitimate alternative, which, far from invoking a new paradigm of 
social responsibility, simply reinstates traditional free market principles. 
While the practicalities of this approach are more complex than what has 
been laid out here, particularly given the need for country-specific 
approaches, the principle of consistency in adherence to free market norms 
is a critical starting point. 
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